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COVERAGE OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
Malcolm M. Davisson*

T

HE Fair Labor Standards Act 1 was upheld by the Supreme Court
as a valid exercise of the commerce power in United States v. Darby.2 By expressly overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart 8 and limiting the
application of Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,4 the Court recognized that
production is not to be divorced from commerce and extended greatly
the range of Congressional control over substandard labor conditions
through exercise of the commerce power. There remained, however,
the determination of the coverage of the act, which is essentially a problem of statutory delineation in the application of the act to particular
fact situations presented to the courts. The Supreme Court has indicated the nature of the problem in a recent case:
"To search for a dependable touchstone by which to determine
whether employees are 'engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce' is as rewarding as an attempt to square the
circle. The judicial task in marking out the extent to which Congress has exercised its constitutional power over commerce is not
that of devising an abstract formula. Perhaps in no domain of
public law are general propositions less helpful and indeed more
mischievous than where boundaries must be drawn, under a federal enactment, between what it has taken over for administration
by the central Government and what it has left to the States. . ..
The expansion of our industrial economy has inevitably been reflected in the extension of federal authority over economic enterprise and its absorption of authority previously possessed by the
States. Federal legislation of this character cannot therefore be
construed without regard to the implications of our dual system of
government." 5
The problem of statutory delineation is difficult because of the wide
variety of organizational patterns under which modern business is car-

*

A.B., University of California; Ph.D., Harvard. Associate Professor of Economics, University of California, on leave to attend University of Michigan Law
School. Author of articles and monographs in the field of economics.-Eo.
1 52 Stat. L. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S. C. (1940), § 201 et seq.
2 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941). See also Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 61 S. Ct. 524 (1941).
3 247 U.S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529 (1918). 4 298 U.S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855 (1936).
5 Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 at 520, 62 S. Ct. 1116 (1942).
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ried on, with the result that decisions covering a given situation may not
be applicable to other situations which appear on the surface to be similar but which in substance differ because of the presence or absence of
certain facts. The scope of the act can be defined only by the gradual
process of inclusion and exclusion as applied to a wide variety of fact
situations, and since the act has been in effect for only'a relatively short
period, it must be recognized that its coverage is still unsettled except
as to certain situations upon which the Supreme Court has given opinions. However, certain general concepts, applicable to varying fact
situations, have emerged from the decisions, and with these as guides,
the general outlines of the act's coverage are becoming clearer.
The problem of statutory delineation involves consideration of (I)
the legislative history of the act; and (2) its language, construed in
light of the policy of Congress 6 and "the implications of our dual
system of government."

I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND LANGUAGE oF THE AcT

A. Legislative History
In one of its intermediate stages the bill incorporated the Shreveport 7 doctrine, being applicable to intrastate production under substandard labor conditions which competed with goods produced in other
states. 8 But this provision was rejected and, as passed by the House,
the bill applied to employers "engaged in commerce in any industry
affecting commerce." 9 However, as recommended by the conference
committee, it applied only to employers "engaged in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce." 10 An examination of Congressional debates on the measure indicates that it was not intended to
extend to all employees' of an industry which was engaged in interstate
commerce but only to those employees who themselves were engaged
either in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce.11
See§ 2 of the act, 52 Stat. L. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S. C. (1940), § 202.
Houston, E. & W. Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 34 S. Ct. 833
(1914).
8 S. 2475, § 8a, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
9 H. REP. 2182, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), p. 2.
10 H. REP. 2738, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), pp. 29-30.
11 See statement of Senator Pepper, 83 CoNG. REc. 9168 (1938).
6
7
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B. Language of the Act
The minumum wage [ § 6 (a)] and maximum hour [ § 7 (a)] provisions of the act apply to employees "engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce." 12 The term "produced" as used
in the act is defined [ § 3 (j) ] as "produced, manufactured, mined,
handled, or in any other manner worked on in any State; and •.. an
employee shall be deemed to have been engaged in the production of
goods if such ~mployee was employed in producing, manufacturing,
mining, handling, transporting, or in any other manner working on
such goods, or in any process or occupation necessary to the production
thereof, in any State." 18 "Goods" [§ 3 (i)] means "goods ... wares,
products, commodities, merchandise, or articles or subjects of commerce of any chilracter, or any part or ingredient thereof, but does not
include goods after their delivery into the actual physical possession of
the ultimate consumer thereof other than a producer, manufacturer,
or processor thereof." 14 It is made unlawful [ § r 5 (a) ( r)] for any
person "to transport, offer for transportation, ship, deliver, or sell in
commerce, or to ship, deliver, or sell with knowledge that shipment or
delivery or sale thereof in commerce is intended, any goods in the production of which any employee was employed in violation of section
6 or section 7" 15 and [ § r 5 (b)] "proof that any employee was em-·
ployed in any place of employment where goods shipped or sold in
commerce were produced, within ninety days prior to the removal of
the goods from such place of employment, shall be prima facie evidence
that such employee was engaged in the production of such goods." 16
"Engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" 17 is narrower than the language employed in many other federal regulatory statutes-"current of commerce," 18 "in restraint of
52 Stat. L. 1062, 1063 (1938), 29 U.S. C. (1940), §§ 206 (a), 207 (a).
52 Stat. L. 1061 (1938), 29 U.S. C. (1940), § 203 (j).
14 52 Stat. L. 1061 (1938), 29 U.S. C. (1940), § 203 (i).
15 52 Stat. L. 1068 (1938), 29 U.S. C. (1940), § 215 (a) (1).
16 52 Stat. L. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S. C. (1940), § 215 (b).
17 The phrase "in commerce" or its equivalent was used in the Motor Carrier Act,
§ 202 (b), 49 Stat. L. 543 (1935), as amended by 54 Stat. L. 920 (1940), 49
U.S. C. (1940), § 302 (a); Interstate Transportation of Petroleum Products Act,
§§ 3, 4, 49 Stat. L. 31 (1935), 15 U.S. C. (1940), §§ 715b, .715c; Cotton
Standards Act, § 2, 42 Stat. L. 1517 (1923), 7 U.S. C. (1940), § 52; Naval Stores
Act,§ 5, 42 Stat. L. 1436 (1923), 7 U.S. C. (1940), § 95; Grain Standards Act,
§ 4, 39 Stat. L. 483 (1916), 7 U.S. C. (1940), § 76; Federal Trade Commission
Act,§ 5, 38 Stat. L. 719 (1914), as amended by 52 Stat. L. III (1938), 15 U.S. C.
(1940), § 45.
.
18 Tobacco Inspection Act, § I (i), 49 Stat. L. 731 (1935), 7 U.S. C. (1940),
12

13
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commerce," 19 "affecting commerce," 20 and "burden and obstruct the
normal channels of interstate commerce." 21 Therefore decisions as to
the coverage of other federal regulatory statutes couched in broader
language cannot be relied upon as controlling in determining the scope
of the act. 22
•
The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is plenary
and may be extended to activities which, when isolated, are essentially
local in character, but which injuriously affect interstate commerce or
the free flow of goods in interstate commerce; 23 but when Congress has
seen fit to regulate activities which in isolation are local in order to
protect interstate commerce, its purpose has generally been stated explicitly.24 Considering the language of the act, viewed in light of its
legislative history, it is clear that its scope is not coextensive with the
limits of Congressional power over commerce, since_ it does not extend
to activities which merely "affect" commerce.26 This has doubtless been
in part the reason for a narrow interpretation of the language of the
§ 5n (i); Grain Futures Act, § 2(b), 42 Stat. L. 999 (1922), 7 U.S. C. (1940),
§ 3; Packers and Stockyards Act, § 2, 42 Stat. L. 160 (1921), 7 U.S. C. (1940),
§ 183.
19 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, § 1, 26 Stat. L. 209 (1890), as amended by 50
Stat. L. 693 (1937), 15 U.S. C. (1940), § 1.
20 Bituminous Coal Act, § 4A, 50 Stat. L. 83 (1937), 15 U.S. C. (1940), §
834; National Labor Relations Act, § IO (a), 49 Stat. L. 453 (1935), 29 U.S. C.
(1940}, § 160; Federal Employers' Liability Act, § 1, 35 Stat. L. 65 (1908), as
amended by 53 Stat. L. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S. C. (1940), § 51.
21 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, § l, 48 Stat. L. 3 l ( l 93 3), as amended
by 50 Stat. L. 246-247 (1937), 7 U.S. C. (1940), § 6e1.
22 See Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 494; Walling
v. Jacksonville Paper Co., (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 332; Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling,
316 U.S. 517, 62 S. Ct. lII6 (1942).
23 United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. II0, 62 S. Ct. 523
(1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941); National
Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 59 S. Ct. 668 (1939); Santa Cruz
Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 303 U.S. 453, 58 S. Ct. 656
(1938); National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 U.S.
1, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937); Thornton v. United States, 271 U: S. 414, 46 S. Ct. 585
(1926); Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olson, 262 U.S. 1, 43 S. Ct. 470 (1923);
Houston, E. & W. Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 34 S. Ct. 833 (1914).
24 Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Brothers, 312 U.S. 349, 61 S. Ct. 580
(1941). See National Labor Relations Act, § 2(7), 49 Stat. L. 450 (1935), 29
U.S. C. (1940), § 152 (7); Bituminous Coal Act, § 4A, 50 Stat. L. 83 (1937),
15 U.S. C. (1940), § 834; Federal Employers' Liability Act, § 1, 35 Stat. L. 65
(1908), as amended by 53 Stat. L. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S. C. (1940), § 51 •
.25 Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 494; Higgins v.
Carr Bros. Co., (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 337; Kirschbaum Co. v. Wallin~, 316 U.S.
517, 62 s. Ct. lII6 (1942).
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act by certain lower federal courts; 26 but recent decisions of the Supreme Court indicate that this is not a ground for excessive restriction
of coverage. In Overstreet v. North Shore Corporation 21 the Court
said:
" ... But the policy of Congressional abnegation with respect
to occupations affecting commerce is no reason for narrowly circumscribing the phrase 'engaged in commerce.' ... 'It is clear that
the purpose of the Act was to extend federal control in this field
throughout the farthest reaches of the channels of interstate commerce.'"

II
GENERAL TEST OF COVERAGE

The act does not provide for blanket coverage of industries as a
whole. 28 The test of coverage is the relation of the activities of the
·individual employee to interstate commerce or the production of goods
for interstate commerce rather than the nature of the employer's business. 29 It is not enough that the employer himself be engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.80 Under the employee test, some employees in a given industry may be covered and .
others not; 81 and some employees '.may be covered at one time but,
when engaged in other activities, be outside the scope of the act. 82
The application of the act is not dependent upon the size of the
industry nor upon the amount of goods shipped in interstate com26 These cases are discussed in succeeding sections.

(U.S. 1943) 63 S.&oCt. 494 at 496, quoting Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co.,
(U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 332 at 335.
28 Foster v. National Biscuit Co., (D. C. Wash. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 552.
29 Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 494; Walling v.
Jacksonville Paper Co., (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 332; Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co.
v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88, 63 S. Ct. 125 (1942); Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S.
517, 62 S. Ct. 1116 (1942).
so Jax Beer Co. v. Redfern, (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) 124 F. (2d) 172; Wood v.
Central Sand & Gravel Co., (D. C. Tenn. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 40; Foster v. National
Biscuit Co., (D. C. Wash. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 552.
31 See Interpretative Bull. 5, § 9, I 942 WAGE AND HouR MANUAL 28 (here~fter
cited W. H. MAN.). The act may apply to separate parts of an employer's business
while other parts are exempt. Davis v. Goodman Lumber Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1943)
133 F. (2d) 52; Fleming v. Hawkeye Button Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1940) 113 F.
(2d) 52.
32 See Interpretative Bull. 5, § 9, 1942 W. H. MAN. -z8. The Wage & Hour
Division has taken the position that the workweek is the standard; if in any workweek
an employee produces goods for commerce and also produces goods to be sold for local
consumption, he is entitled to both the wage and hour benefits for all the time worked
during that week. The proportion of the employee's time spent in each type of work
is not material. Id.
27
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merce; 33 nor is it material whether the goods so shipped constitute the
principal product of the producer, since one employer may ship in commerce as a byproduct a volume of goods greatly exceeding the principal
production of another employer.34 The character rather than the size
of an activity is determinative.35 Congress, in attempting to suppress
nationwide competition in interstate commerce by goods produced under substandard labor conditions, has recognized that the maintenance
of such substandard conditions in a particular industry by a few employers is likely to lower standards for the whole industry 36 and that
the competition of many small producers may, in the aggregate, be
sufficient to depress labor conditions generally.37
A number of cases attempt to distinguish between a small producer
who ships all of his product across state lines and a producer, large or
small, who ships occasionally an inconsequential part of his total output
in interstate commerce. If a "substantial" part of a concern's business
is interstate, federal control may be exercised over the whole enterprise; 88 but if only a small part of a concern's output moves out-ofstate, many courts have applied the de minimis doctrine. 89 There is no
88 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941); Walling v.
Peoples Packing Co., (C. C. A. 10th, 1942) 132 F. (2d) 236, cert. denied (U.S.
1943) 63 S. Ct. 831; Wood v. Central Sand & Gravel Co., (D. C. Tenn. 1940) 33
F. Supp. 40.
84 Walling v. Peoples Packing Co., (C.C.A. 10th, 1942) 132 F. (2d) 236,
cert. denied (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 831.
35 Davis v. Goodman Lumber Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1943) 133 F. (2d) 52.
86 H. REP. 2182, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), p. 7.
87 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941).
88 Walling v. Peoples Packing Co., ( C. C. A. I oth, 1942) I 3 2 F. ( 2d) 2 36, cert.
denied (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 831; Collins v. Kidd Dairy & Ice Co., (C. C. A. 5th,
1942) 132 F. (2d) 79; Snyder v. Casale, (D. C. N. Y. 1942) 5 WAGE & HouR
REPORTER 222 (hereafter cited W. H. REP.); Drake v. Hirsch, (D. C. Ga. 1941)
40 F. Supp. 290; Nelson v. Southern Ice Co., (D. C. Tex. 1941) 4 W. H. REP.
562; Wood v. Central Sand & Gravel Co., (D. C. Tenn. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 40. See
note 60, infra, and the discussion, infra, of Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co. (U. S.
1943) 63 S. Ct. 332.
39 Gaston v. Dalton Ice Co., (D. C. Ga. 1943) 6 W. H. REP. 241; Zehring v.
Brown Materials, (D. C. Cal. 1943) 48 F. Supp. 740; Patschke v. Murphy Butter &
Egg Co., (D. C. Ill. 1943) 6 W. H. REP. u4; Brown v. Tracy Bottling Co., (D. C.
Minn. 1942) 5 W. H. REP. 502; Adams v. Wewoka Brick & Tile Co., (D. C. Okla.
1942) 5 W. H. REP. 338; Baker v. Chapman Dairy Co., (D. C. Mo. 1942) 5 W. H.
REP. 56; Goldberg v. Worman, (D. C. Fla. 1941) 37 F. Supp. 778; Owens v.
Gifford-Hill Pipe Co., (D. C. Tex. 1941) 4 W. H. REP. 697; Morrow v. Lee
Baking Co., (D. C. Ga. 1941) 4 W. H. REP. 458; Hooks v. Nashville Breeko Block
& Tile Co., (D. C. Tenn. 1941) 39 F. Supp. 369; Kidd v. Royal Crown Bottling
Co., (Tenn. App. 1942) 6 W. H. REP. u5; Whitson v. Wexler, (Tenn. Ch. 1941)
4 w. H. REP. 91.
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objective test to determine the precise point at which interstate sales
become "substantial" or when occasional sales become regular, with
the result that there is considerable divergence among lower federal
courts as to when the de minimis doctrine may appropriately be applied.
The impact upon interstate commerce, although it may vary in
intensity, is still present whether products of substandard labor move
from one producer in large lots or from many producers in small' lots;
hence the de·minimis doctrine should be applied only in those cases of
occasional interstate shipment where the effects on interstate commerce
are reasonably certain to be slight in the aggregate.

III
EMPLOYEES "ENGAGED IN COMMERCE"

The Wage and Hour Division has defined employees "engaged in
commerce" to include typically those employed in the telephone, telegraph,40 radio, and transportation 41 industries which serve as actual
instrumentalities and channels of interstate commerce and those' who
are an essential part of the stream of interstate commerce-e.g., employees of warehouses whose storage facilities are used in the interstate
distribution of goods. 42
The cases involving employees "engaged in commerce" are concerned principally 43 with (I) employees in distributive trades; and ( 2)
employees maintaining, repairing, and operating instrumentalities of
interstate commerce.

A. Employees in Distribution Trades 44
The majority of cases distinguish between employees who participate in the receipt of goods from other states and those whose contact
40 Moss v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., (D. C. Ga. 1941) 42 F. Supp. 807, holds
that the branch manager of a company engaged in transmitting messages interstate, and
whose duties included sending and receiving telegrams, was within the act.
41 Sec. 13 (b) of the a1;t provides that the provisions of § 7 shall not apply to
any employee with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to
establish qualifications· and maximum hours pursuant to_ the Motor Carrier Act of l 93 5
or to employees of any employer subject to Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act.
52 Stat. L. 1068 (1938), 29 U.S. C. (1940), § 213 (b).
42 lnterpretative Bull. 1, § 4, 1942 W. H. MAN. 23.
43 See the discussion of building maintenance employees, infra.
44 Sec. 13 (a) of the act provides that the minimum wage and maximum hour
provisions shall not apply to any employee employed in a local retailing capacity or in
the capacity of outside salesman or to any employee engaged in any retail or service
establishment the greater part of whose selling or service is intrastate. 52 Stat. L.
1067 (1938), 29 U.S. C. (1940), § 213 (a).
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with the goods comes only after receipt at the employer's warehouse.
Employees ordering,4 5 transporting,46 checking,4 7 and'unloading 48 goods
-imported from other states are within the act. Likewise employees who
participate in the sale and delivery of goods from the employer's
warehouse to customers in other states are included.49 The difficult
problems have arisen with respect to employees whose contact with the
goods occurs between receipt at the employer's warehouse and subsequent delivery to the customer. The cases involve two types of fact
situations: (I) goods imported from other states by wholesale distributors for subsequent local distribution to independent retail establishments; and ( 2) goods imported from other states for subsequent local
distribution, not in anticipation of retail demands of others, but to meet
the requirements of the importer's own local retail outlets.
Two conflicting theories have been followed by lower federal courts
in cases of the first type involving the independent wholesaler. With
the Schechter 50 decision as a starting point, the majority of courts, fol45 Walling v. Goldblatt Bros., (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 778, cert.
denied (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 528; Walling v..Mutual Wholesale Food & Supply Co.,
(D. C. Minn. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 939; Eddings v. Southern Dairies, (D.C.S.C. 1942)
42 F. Supp. 664; Drake v. Hirsch, (D. C. Ga. 1941) 40 F. Supp. 290.
46
Walling v. Sanders, (D. C. Tenn. 1942) 48 F. Supp. 9; Gerdert v. Certified
Poultry & Egg Co., (D. C. Fla. 1941) 38 F. Supp. 964; Fleming v. Alterman, (D. C.
Ga. 1941) 38 F. Supp. 94.
47
Walling v. American Stores Co., (C. C. A. 3d, 1943) 133 F. (2d) 840; Walling v. Goldblatt Bros., (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) 128 F. ( 2d) 778, cert. denied (U. S.
1943) 63 S. Ct. 528; Walling v. Mutual Wholesale Food & Supply Co., (D. C. Minn.
1942) 46 F. Supp. 939.
48
Walling v. American Stores Co., (C. C. A. 3d, 1943) 133 F. (2d) 840; Walling v. Goldblatt Bros., (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 778, cert. denied (U.S.
1943) 63 S. Ct. 528; Super-Cold Southwest Co. v. McBride, (C. C. A. 5th, 1941)
124 F. (2d) 90; Walling v. Mutual Wholesale Food & Supply Co., (D. C. Minn.
1942) 46 F. Supp. 939; Walling v. Sanders, (D. C. Tenn. 1942) 48 F. Supp. 9;
Klotz v. Ippolito, (D. C. Tex. 1941) 40 F. Supp. 422; Fleming v. Alterman, (D. C.
Ga. 1941) 38 F. Supp. 94. In Gerdert v. Certified Poultry & Egg Co., (D. C. Fla.
1941) 38 F. Supp. 964, it was held that title and possession vested in the wholesaler
upon delivery by the carrier and any movement thereafter was purely intrastate; therefore employees hauling goods from a depot and those unloading goods from interstate
trucks into the store were not engaged in interstate commerce. Cf. Rauhoff v. Gramling & Co., (D. C. Ark. 1941) 42 F. Supp. 754.
49
Walling v. Goldblatt Bros., (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 778, cert.
denied (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 528; Walling v. Mutual Wholesale Food & Suppy Co.,
(D. C. Minn. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 939; Lewis v. Nailling (D. C. Tenn. 1940) 36 F.
Supp. 187; Gibson v. Glasgow, 178 Tenn. 273, 157 S. W. (2d) 814 (1942). In
Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 332, it was not contended
that d<;livery employees at branch warehouses delivering goods to customers in other
states were not within the act. 63 S. Ct. 332 at 334.
150
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837
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lowing a "state of rest" theory, have argued that the goods complete
their interstate journey when they come to rest in the wholesaler's
warehouse, becoming intermingled with the mass of property subject
to state control. Any subsequent activity in.connection with such goods
is purely intrastate and employees engaged in warehousing,51, selling,52
and distributing 53 to local customers consequently are outside the scope
of the act. The "prior order" doctrine has also been used to reach the
same conclusion, the act applying only where goods are imported pursuant to specific orders received by the wholesaler from his retail cus- tamers. Without such prior orders, the goods being ordered merely to
meet anticipated future demands, interstate commerce ceases when the
goods come to rest in the state and does not continue until demand
eventuates in the form of an order and delivery is made to the retailer.
The mere fact that an anticipated local transaction sets in motion a
movement in interstate commerce is not sufficient to constitute the local
transaction a part of interstate commerce. 54
The Wage and Hour Division has opposed the "prior order" doctrine, arguing that the wholesaler, even in the absence of prior orders
or contracts, attains a relatively high degree of certainty in his antici(1935). The Court said, "The mere fact that there may be a constant How of commodities into a state does not mean that the flow continues after the property has
arrived and has become commingled with the mass of property within the state and
is there held solely for local distribution and use." 295 U.S. 495 at 543.
51 Walling v. Mutual Wholesale Food & Supply Co., (D. C. Minn. 1942) 46 F.
Supp. 939; Eddings v. Southern Dairies, (D. C. S. C. 1942) 42 F. Supp. 664; Hall
v. Smith, (D. C. Ky. 1942) 5 W. H. REP. 637; Walling v. Sanders, (D. C. Tenn.
1942) 48 F. Supp. 9; Drake v. Hirsch, (D. C. Ga. 1941) 40 F. Supp. 290; Bock v.
Hoffman, (Colo. 1942) 130 P. (2d) 691.
52 Jax Beer Co. v. Redfern, (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) 124 :i;:. (2d) 172; Eddings v.
Southern Dairies, (D. C. S. C. 1942) 42 F. Supp. 664; Klotz v. Ippolito, (D. C.
Tex. 1941) 40 F. Supp. 422; Abadie v. Cudahy Packing Co., (D. C. La. 1941)
37 F. Supp. 164.
53 Swift & Co. v. Wilkerson, (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) 124 F. (2d) 176; Jax Beer
Co. v. Redfern, (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) 124 F. (2d) 172; Moses v. McKesson &
Robbins, (D. C. Tex. 1942) 43 F. Supp. 528; Walling v. Mutual Wholesale Food
& Supply Co., (D. C. Minn. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 939; Walling v. Silver Bros.
(D. C. N. H. 1942) 5 W. H. REP. 533; Porter v. Wilson & Co., (D. C. Tex. 1942)
5 W. H. REP. 152; Gerdert v. Certified Poultry & Egg Co., (D. C. Fla. 1941) 38 F.
Supp. 964; Gibson v. Glasgow, 178 Tenn. 273, 157 S. W. (2d) 814 (1942).
Employees engaged in distributing "drop shipments" are within the act. Drake
v. Hirsch, (D.C. Ga. 1941) 40 F. Supp: 290.
u Wailing v. Goldblatt Bros., (C.C.A. 7th, 1942) 128 F. ( 2d) 778, cert. denied
(U'.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 528; Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams, (C.C.A. 10th, 1941) u8 F.
(2d) 202; Walling v. Mutual Wholesale Food & Supply Co., (D.C. Minn. 1942) 46
F. Supp. 939; Rauhoff v. Gramling & Co., (D.C. Ark. 1941) 42 F. Supp. 754; Bock
v. Hoffman, (Colo. 1942) 130 P. (2d) 691.
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patory ordering. He does not buy to accumulate local stocks to meet
demands as they arise but rather adjusts his orders to the antici.pated
demands of his usually stable clientele; therefore he knows with considerable certainty where goods are going without prior orders or
contracts. 55 The "state of rest" and "prior order" doctrines in their
rigid forms, while providing convenient rules-of-thumb, appear overly
artificial and mechanical. In the present system of distribution, the distributor's warehouses are not necessarily the ultimate destination contemplated when interstate commerce is set in motion; but often there
is a fl.ow of goods into and through warehouses to retail stores in anticipation of recurring demands either from independent retail stores or
from the distributor's own outlets. Therefore, any mechanical tests
divorced from the methods of distribution followed by the particular
distributor would seem unsatisfactory.
In conflict with the "state of rest" and "prior order" doctrines is
the theory that the goods remain in the stream of interstate commerce
until they reach their ultimate destination-the local retail outlet-and
employees handling such goods are within the scope of the act until
the goods reach this ultimate destination intended or contemplated by
the wholesaler when he set in motion the interstate shipment. 56 Under
this theory the wholesaler occupies an intermediate rather than a terminal position in the fl.ow of goods in interstate commerce from manufacturers to retailers.
Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 51 the first independent wholesaler case to be decided by the Supreme Court, involved employees at
branch warehouses receiving goods on interstate shipments and distributing them to local customers. 58 Some goods were shipped direct
from mills to the company's customers; some were purchased on special
orders from customers, consigned to branches for checking, and then
delivered to the customers; but the bulk of the goods passed. through
the branch warehouses before delivery to customers. The evidence indi5 W. H. REP. 906-907 ( l 942).
Flemingv. Alterman, (D.C. Ga. 1941) 38 F. Supp. 94; Gavril v. Kraft Cheese
Co., (D.C. Ill. 1941) 42 F. Supp. 702. The act has been held applicable on the continuity of movement theory to employees of tobacco warehouses handling tobacco part
of which came from out-of-state and most of which was shipped by purchasers to other
states. Walling v. Lincoln Loose Leaf Warehouse Co., (D.C. Tenn. 1943) 6 W. H.
REP. 68; Fleming v. Kenton Loose Leaf Tobacco Co., (D.C. Ky. 1941) 41 F. Supp.
55

56

2

55·
57

(U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 332.
It was not contended that the act did not apply to delivery employees at other
warehouses delivering goods to customers out-of-state. 63 S. Ct. 332 at 334.
118
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cated that the company's customers constituted a fairly stable group
whose orders were recurrent as to volume and kind of goods. Some
items carried in stock were ordered only in anticipation of the needs of
particular customers on the basis of a contract or understanding; and
there was some evidence that branch managers, before placing orders
for stock items, had a fair idea when and to whom the goods would be
sold and could estimate with reasonable accuracy the immediate needs
of customers, even in t,he absence of contracts calling for future deliveries. The circuit court of appeals, in reversing a district court holding that the act did not cover any of the branch house employees, held
(1) that employees engaged in procuring and.receiving goods across
state lines were "engaged in commerce" within the meaning of the act;
and (2) that where the wholesaler took an order from a customer, purchased the goods outside of the state, and shipped them in interstate
commerce "with the definite intention that those goods be carried at
once to that customer, and they are so carried, the whole movement is
interstate" and those employees engaged in handling the goods to
their final destination were "engaged in commerce." 59 The Supreme
Court modified the strict interpretation of the circuit court of appeals,
but at the same time rejected the contention of the adminisrator that
all employees of wholesalers engaged in local distriqution of goods of
out-of-state origin whose c:ustomers form a stable group with orders
recurrent as to volume and kind of goods should be brought within the
coverage of the act. The act was held to cover employees a "substantial
part" of whose activities involved (I) procurement or receipt of goods
from other states; and ( 2) handling or delivering to local customers
goods of out-of-state origin pursuant to either special orders or preexisting contracts or understandings with customers.60 It would appear
that, by implication employees delivering goods to customers from
59

Fleming v. Jacksonville Paper Co., (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 395 at

398.
60

In Ouendag v. Gibson, (D.C. Mich. 1943) 6 W. H. REP. 305, the act was
held inapplicable to a salesman, office employee, store clerk, and maintenance employee
whose employer operated a store and warehouse, selling within the state at retail and
wholesale merchandise obtained from outside the state. The Court referred to the
statement in the Jacksonville case that a "substantial part'' of the work of the distributor's employees must be related to interstate commerce to bring them within the act,
but found that the merchandise came to rest upon being unloaded at the warehouse and
that the employees' activities in unloading goods from interstate trucks, placing orders
for merchandise by mail, and making occasional trips outside the state to purchase merchandise did not constitute a "substantial part" of the work of the employees. Cf.
Walling v. Reuter, (D.C. La., 1g43) 6 W. H. REP. 385. .
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regular stocks maintained by wholesalers without any pre-existing contract or understanding would not be within the act.
In meeting the administrator's contention that under the decision
of the circuit court any pause at the warehouse is sufficient to deprive
the remainder of the journey of its interstate character, the Court said:
" ... The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals is susceptible
of the interpretation that such a pause at the warehouse is sufficient
to make the Act inapplicable to the subsequent movement of the
goods to their intended destination. We believe, however, that
the adoption of that view would result in too narrow a construction
of the Act. It _is clear that the purpose of the Act was to extend
federal control in this field throughout the farthest reaches of the
channels of interstate commerce. There is no indication . . . that,
once the goods entered the channels of interstate commerce, Congress stopped short of control over the entire movement of them
until their interstate journey was ended. No ritual of placing
goods in a warehouse can be allowed to defeat that purpose. The
entry of the goods into a warehouse interrupts but does not necessarily terminate their interstate journey.... if the halt in the
movement of goods is a convenient intermediate step in getting
them to their final destinations, they remain 'in commerce' until
they reach those points." 61

In expanding the transactions covered by the act tq include those
carried on pursuant to pre-existing contracts or understandings with
customers, the Court argued that such contracts or understandings, like
special orders, indicate where it is intended the terminal point of interstate movement should be. Here again a temporary break in physical
continuity of transit at the wholesaler's warehouse is not sufficient to
end the interstate journey at the warehouse; nor will the fact that the
wholesaler may treat the goods as stock in trade during an interval •
before their ultimate delivery to the customer or that title to the goods
may pass to the wholesaler on intermediate delivery have this effect.
The Court rejected the argument that since wholesalers doing a local
business are in competition with wholesalers whose business is interstate,
the latter will be prejudiced if competitors are not required to meet the
same labor standards, arguing that such a consideration would be pertinent only if the act extended to transactions "affecting'' commerce.
Likewise it rejected the administrator's contention that the act should
apply whenever the wholesaler's customers constitute a stable group
61

(U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 332 at 335.
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whose orders are recurrent as to volume and kind so that the needs of
the trade can be estimated with precision. In rejecting this contention,
however, the Court used this significant language,
" ... Wedo not mean to imply that a wholesaler's course of business based on anticipation of needs of specific customers, rather
than on prior orders or contracts, might not at times be sufficient
to establish that practical continuity in transit necessary to keep a
movement of goods 'in commerce' within the meaning of the
Act.... We do not believe, however, that on this phase of the case
such a course of business is revealed by the record. The evidence
said to support it is of a wholly general character and lacks that
particularity necessary to show that the goods in question were different from goods acquired and held by a local merchant for local
disposition." 62
Since the Court did not indicate what course of business would be
sufficient to establish "practical continuity of transit necessary to keep
a movement of goods 'in commerce'," the implications of the statement
are not clear and the decision leaves still open an important segment of
the independent wholesaler problem.
In a companion case, Higgins v. Carr. Bros. Co.,63 the Supreme6
Court affirmed a holding of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, "'
denying application of the act to an employee of a wholesale produce
firm distributing locally goods of out-of-state origin on the ground that
interstate movement ended when the imported goods were unloaded at
the wholesaler's warehouse. This decision, in view of the meager record of the distributor's course of business, adds little to solution of the
independent wholesaler problem.
With respect to warehouse employees of distributors importing
goods to meet the requirements of their own retail outlets-the typical
chain store method of operation-the Supreme Court's refusal to review the decision in Walling v. Goldblatt Bros.65 leaves in effect the
62

(U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 332 at 336.
(U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 337.
64 Higgins v. Carr Bros., (Me. 1942) 25 A. (2d) 214.
65 (C.C.A. 7th, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 778, cert. denied (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 528.
Certiorari was denied subsequent to the decisions in Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co.
and Higgins v. Carr Bros., supra. The Goldblatt case was followed in Walling v.
Wiemen Co., (D.C. Wis. 1943) 6 W. H. REP. 348. The district court in its opinion
in the Goldblatt case held, with respect to shipments from warehouses in Illinois to the
distributor's retail outlets in Indiana, that "The activities •.• constitute intrastate commerce in every sense, save only for the physical presence of the state line between
Illinois and Indiana. While the region where the activities are carried on embraces
63
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holding of the circuit court of appeals that the line between coverage
and noncoverage is the unloading platform of the warehouse. Employees ordering and procuring goods from other states, those who
unload them at the distributor's warehouse, and those who check them
before they are deposited on the unloading platform are within the
act. But employees moving the goods into the warehouse, storing them,
and making deliveries to the distributor's local retail outlets are excluded from coverage. 00 The reasoning with respect to chain store
warehouse employees is analogous to that applied by the majority of
lower federal courts in the independent wholesaler cases, and here too
the "prior order" doctrine is followed.
In Walling v. American Stores Co., 67 decided by the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court in the Jacksonville Paper Co. case, it was held that the act
applied to all employees at warehouses maintained by a chain store
system for distribution of out-of-state goods to its local retail stores,
such merchandise being ordered in anticipation· of the regular and conportions of two states, nevertheless the activities themselves comprise a continuous and
integrated business and economic unit, local in character...•" Fleming v. Goldblatt
Bros., (D.C. Ill. 1941) 39 F. Supp. 701 at 705. The circuit court rejected this theory.
Cf. Collins v. Kidd Dairy & Ice Co., (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 132 F. (2d) 79, where a
single town was divided by a state line.
66 The "state of rest" theory was applied with respect to goods coming into a
retailer's warehouse in Veazey Drug Co. v. Fleming, (D.C. Okla. 1941) 42 F. Supp.
689 at 696, where the court said, "If the edge of the dock and the rear end of the
truck constituted this line [between intrastate and interstate commerce] and the driver
of the truck and his helpers removed the goods to this line and they were received onto
the dock side of the line by the defendant employees, to contend that said employees
were acting in interstate commerce is certainly 'pushing' the construction of the statute
to an extent not contemplated by the legislative body." The act has been held inapplicable on the "state of rest" theory to: (1) employees of branch warehouses of a
company distributing out-of-state goods, Fleming v. McGehee, (D.C. Fla. 1941) 4
W. H. REP. 444; (2) employees in warehouses operated by a sugar company for storage
of sugar pending subsequent distribution to its retail outlets, Rivera v. Central Aguirre
Sugar Co., (D.C. P.R. 1941) 4 W. H. REP. 272; (3) truck drivers of a retail grocer
making local deliveries of out-of-state goods from the company's warehouse to its retail
stores, Fitzgerald v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., (D.C. Kan. 1942) 45 F. Supp.
812; (4) truck drivers of a dairy company making local deliveries of out-of-state goods,
Walling v. Bridgeman-Russell Co., (D.C. Minn. 1942) 6 W. H. REP. 132; (5) tankwagon salesmen making local deliveries of gasoline from employer's bulk plant, Riley
v. Standard Oil Co., (Tenn. App. 1942) 6 W. H. REP. 47; (6) office and warehouse
employees handling out-of-state goods for pharmacy company operating retail outlets,
White v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., (D.C. Ga. 1942) 47 F. Supp. 298. The act has been
held applicable to employees of a power and light company engaged in local transmission, distribution, and sale of current manufactured in other states, Barker v. Georgia
Power & Light Co., (D.C. Ga. 1942) 5 W. H. REP. 540.
67
(C.C.A. 3d, 1943) 133 F. (2d) 840.
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tinuous requirements of the retail outlets. This decision, applying the
"practical continuity of movement" doctrine of the Jacksonville Paper
Co. case, carries coverage considerably beyond the limits set by the
Goldblatt case.68 As indicated above, the Supreme Court in the Jacksonville Paper Co. case stated that a wholesaler's course of business based
on anticipation of needs of specific customers, rather than on prior
. orders or contracts, might at times be sufficient to establish that practical
continuity of movement necessary to keep goods in commerce but found
that the evidence in the .record before it, of wholly general character,
did not indicate such a course of business. The court in the American
Stores case stresses the fact that the evidence goes far beyond that of
the Jacksonville Paper Co. case and that it is not dealing with the problem of an independent wholesaler, as was the Supreme Court in the
latter case; rather the entire operation from purchase of the goods to
ultimate sale is conducted by the chain store and the maintenance of
the warehouse is not to break the continuity of movement but to make
it even, economical, and uninterrupted.
The mechanical test of the Goldblatt case, applied without refer·ence to the course of business with respect to the goods after they reach
the unloading platform of the warehouse, appears questionable. The
case of the chain store maintaining warehouses to serve its own retail
outlets does not appear to differ so fundamentally from the case of the
independent wholesaler maintaining warehouses to serve retail stores
owned by others as to require the application of a different test of coverage. The basic issue in both cases should be whether, in a given fact
situation, the evidence indicates continuity of movement through the
warehouse to retail outlets or whether there is in fact such a break in
the interstate journey as will reasonably warrant dividing the transaction into interstate and instrastate activities. Under the, Goldblatt decision, this type of analysis is precluded by application of a mechanical
test without reference to the evidence of the course of business followed
by the distributor; while the method of approach of the American
Stores case forms a basis for analysis of the evidence to determine
whether or not it establishes practical continuity of movement~
The problem of coverage in the field of wholesale distribution is
difficult of solution because of variations in .patterns of distribution between kinds of goods, types of enterprises, and stages of the business

a

68 "This conclusion may go somewhat beyond that .•. in Walling v. Goldblatt
Bros•••• But the court in that case did not have the advantage of the guidance given
by the Supreme Court decisions of Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co. and Higgins v.
Carr Bros. Co." 133 F. (2d) 840 at 846.
'

CovERA~E

OF

FL SA

10 75

cycle. Patterns of distribution will vary as between a service wholesaler
whose salesmen call upon the retail trade and who extends credit to
retail customers and a cash and carry enterprise or a voluntary chain
in which independent retail dealers enter into contractual arrangements
with wholesalers to supply their needs on a planned basis. Moreover,
the internal operation of the particular enterprise may be of significance. Some enterprises may employ a relatively routine procedure in
ordering-when the stock on hand, as indicated by the stock cop.trol
system, reaches a certain point, orders will be placed to maintain inventory at a particular level-while other enterprises may gear their ordering more nearly to the anticipatory demands of their clientele. In
the former case, the procedure provides little indication of the destination of goods moving through the warehouse. Finally, the extent to
which wholesalers will order in anticipation of the demands of their
retail customers will tend to vary through the stages of the business
cycle, the number of transient customers, as distinct from regular customers whose orders can be estimated with reasonable accuracy as to
volume and kind of goods, varying with changes in economic activity.
In light of these considerations, the application of any mechanical test
would appear highly questionable.69

B. Employees Maintaining, Repairing, and Operating
Instrumentalities of Interstate Commerce
The Wage and Hour Division has taken the position that employees of contractors engaged in maintaining, repairing, or reconstructing railroads, ships, highways,7° bridges, pipe lines,71 navigable waters
of the United States, or other essential instrumentalities of interstate
or foreign commerce would seem to be engaged in commerce and subject to the act. 72
69
The writer has received valuable suggestions with respect to wholesaling practices from Dean E. T. Grether of the College of Commerce, University of California.
Dean Grether is in no way responsible, however, for opinions expressed herein.
70
In Shannon v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., (La. App. 1942) 5 W. H. REP. 362,
the act was held inapplicable to employees constructing and repairing city streets used
by vehicles in interstate commerce.
71
ln Crawford v. Campbell, (Okla. Ct. Com. Pleas, 1943) 6 W. H. REP. 156,
the act was held applicable to laborers hired by an independent contractor to lay, take
up, and repair pipe lines for an oil company doing interstate business. It was held
inapplicable to laborers laying, taking up, and repairing local pipelines for a natural
gas company selling gas to local customers some of whom used the fuel in processing
goods moving interstate.
72
Interpretative Bull. 5, § 13, 1942 W. H. MAN. 29. The division has not taken
a definite position with respect to employees engaged in original construction of essential instrumentalities of interstate commerce, 1942 W. H. MAN. 45.
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In Overstreet v. North Shore Corporation 73 the Supreme Court
held, two justices dissenting, that the act covered employees engaged
in maintaining or operating a toll road and a drawbridge over a navigable waterway. Roads and bridges used by persons and goods passing
from state to state were held to be instrumentalities of commerce and
those who maintain or operate them "engaged in commerce." The
corporation, relying upon two tax cases, 74 in which the Supreme Court
had held that companies owning and operating bridges used for interstate and international traffic but not themselves carrying goods or
persons across the bridges were not engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce, contended that it was not engaged in commerce, but only in
· providing facilities for the use of others carrying on commerce; therefore its maintenance employees, whose activities merely affected commerce, were not within the· act. This contention was rejected on the
grounds: (I) that the fact that the corporation may be subject to state
taxation does not imply that it is free from federal control or that its
road and drawbridge are not instrumentalities of interstate commerce;
and ( 2) that, even assuming the corporation was not engaged in interstate commerce, it is the nature of the employee's activities rather than
the employer's business which is controlling. The Court relied on the
practical tests as to the meaning of "engaged in interstate commerce"
evolved in cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act 75
in reaching its conclusion that the employees' activities were "so closely
related to ... interstate movement as a practical matter that . . . they
must be regarded ... as 'engaged in commerce.' " 76
In Pedersen v. Fitzgerald Construction Co.,7 1 the Supreme Court
73 (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 494. The circuit court, affirming the decision of the
district court [ (D.C. Fla. 1941) 43 F. Supp. 445], refused to extend coverage to what
it considered activities merely affecting commerce and argued that if the employer was
not engaged in interstate commerce by virtue of owning and operating the toll road
and bridge, the employees whose duties consisted in· executing the business of the
company were not so engaged. (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 450.
74 Detroit International Bridge Co. v. Corporation Tax Appeal Board, 294 U.S.
83, 55 S. Ct. 332 (1935); Henderson Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U.S. 150, 17 S.
Ct. 532 (1897).
75 "The Federal Employers' Liability Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act are
not strictly analogous, but they are similar...• We see no persuasive reason why the
scope of employed or engaged 'in commerce' laid down in ... [ cases arising under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act] should not be applied to the similar language of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, especially when Congress in adopting the phrase 'engaged
in commerce' had those Federal Employers' Liability Act cases brought to its attention:"
63 S. Ct. 494 at 498.
76
(U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 494 at 499·
77
(U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 558, rehearing denied 1i u:s.L.W. 3273 (1943).
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reversed per curiam on the authority of the Overstreet case a New York
holding that an independent contractor employed by an interstate railroad to construct abutments and repair substructures was performing
work local in character and distinct from interstate commerce so that
his employees were not within the scope of the act. 78
These cases support the position taken by the division and are a
further indication of the Supreme Court's liberal interpretation of the
statutory language.

IV
EMPLOYEES "ENGAGED IN THE PRODUCTION OF
Goons FOR CoMMERCE"

A. Employees in the Physical Process of Production
The act clearly applies to employees engaged in actual physical
production of goods which, at the time of production, the employer in
the normal course of business intends or expects to move across state
lines, although because of the demand situation all of the goods may
not subsequently actually enter interstate commerce. 79 The facts at the
time of production determine whether the employee is engaged in the
production of goods for commerce and not any subsequent acts of the
employer or of third parties.80 Thus the test of the application of the
act to the producer is knowledge that his product will move interstate
when produced; but knowledge is not a matter of the intent or expectation of the producer with respect to particular goods. It is sufficient
that goods are intended or expected in the normal course of business to
move interstate; and if the normal course of business, determined by
the facts at the time of production, does not prove in fact to be the
actual course of business, the act is still applicable.81 Conversely, if the
intention or expectation at the time of production is that in the normal
course of business the goods will be sold locally, the subsequent fact
that the actual course of business involves some interstate movement
would appear not to operate retroactively to make the act applicable. 82
78
Pedersen v. Fitzgerald Constr. Co., 173 Misc. 188, 18 N.Y.S. (2d) 920
(1940), affd. 262 App. Div. 665, 30 N.Y.S. (2d) 989 (1941), affd. 288 N.Y. 687,
43 N.E. (2d) 83 (1942).
79
United States v. Darby,. 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941). See H. REP.
2738, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), p. 17.
so Interpretative Bull. 5, § 3, 1942 W. H. MAN. 25. This view appears to be
adopted, implicitly or explicitly, in the majority of cases. The division takes the
position that the fact that the goods do move in commerce is strong evidence that the
employer intended or had reason to believe the goods would so move. Id.
81
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 6 l S. Ct. 45 l ( l 941).
82
See note So, supra.
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The situations so far considered involve production before· interstate commerce has begun. But production or processing may take place
after goods have entered the state from outside sources with subsequent
sale of the finished product locally. Such production or processing operations could not be included in "production for commerce" and the only
theory upon which coverage could be based would be that such operations occur while the imported goods remain a part of the fl.ow of
interstate commerce. The Wage and Hour Division has indicated that
employees engaged in production of goods for local consumption would
seem to be excluded from the act, even though raw materials going into
the finished product are of out-of-state origin. Their work is done after
the materials have come to a state of rest within the state.83 The division thus appears to disting{iish this situation from that of the wholesaler purchasing goods outside the state for local distribution, where it
contends that the stream of commerce continues until the goods reach
their final destination.84 If, however, in the normal course of business,
imported raw materials, after processing, will cross state lines before
reaching the ultimate consumer, the act applies.85
· The act does not extend to employees working,on raw materials of
local origin where none of the finished product is intended or expected
in the normal course of business to move interstate.86 Such products
made and sold intrastate may come into direct competition in local markets with similar products manufactured outside the state and shipped
in interstate commerce, and if produced under substandard labor conditions may involve the very evils which gave rise to demands for control
measures; but since the act does not extend to transactions merely
"a:ffecting" interstate commerce, there would seem to be no. way to
reach such production under the existing statute.

B. .Employees not in the Physical Process of Production
In defining "produced," the act provides that "an employee shall be
deemed to have been engaged in the production, of goods if such employee was employed in producing, manufacturing, mining, handling,
transporting, or in any other manner working on such goods, or in
83 Interpretative Bull. 5, § 10, 1942 W. H. MAN, 28. See Jones v. Springfield
Missouri Packing Co., (D.C. Mo. 1942) 45 F. Supp. 997. The d,ivision indicates,
however, that other employees in the same plant, such as those purchasing or unloading
raw materials from out-of-state sources, may be "engaged in commerce." 1942 W. H.
MAN. 28.
s,i, Interpretative Bull. 5, § 15, 1942 W. H. MAN. 29-30.
85
Fleming v. Tidewater Optical Co., (D.C. Va. 1940) 35 F. Supp. 1015.
86
Interpretative Bull. 1, § 6, 1942 W. H. MAN. 24.
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any process or occupation necessary to the production thereof, in any
State." 87 It is not necessary, therefore, that employees actually participate in the physical process of producing goods to be deemed engaged
in their production. 88 It is sufficient that the activities of the employees
constitute a "process or occupation necessary to the production." The
act has been held applicable by lower federal courts to clerical and office
employees not directly engaged in physical production; 89 to employees
preparing and serving meals to workers engaged in production of goods
for interstate commerce; 90 and to watchmen 91 whose employers were
87

Sec. 3 (j), 52 Stat. L. 1061 (1938), 29 U.S. C. (1940), § 203 (j).
Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 62 S. Ct. 1116 (1942); MidContinent Pipe Line Co. v. Hargrave, (C.C.A. 10th, 1942) 129 F. (2d) 655.
89
Fleming v. Swift & Co., (D.C. Ill. 1941) 41 F. Supp. 82 5; Berger v. Clouser,
(D.C. Pa. 1940) 36 F. Supp. 168. In Murray v. Noblesville Milling Co, (C.C.A. 7th,
1942) 131 F. (2d) 470, cert. denied (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 832, the act was held
applicable to employees of a milling company shipping grain and flour interstate who
purchased at the elevator grain brought by farmers from nearby points, sent the wheat
by conveyor to the mill, and kept the machinery in running condition. Such activities
were held to be necessary for production of goods for commerce.
90
Hanson v. Lagerstrom, (C.C.A. 8th, 1943) 133 F. (2d) 120; Consolidated
Timber Co. v. Womack, (C.C.A. 9th, 1942) 132 F. (2d) 101. Contra: McLeod v:
Threlkeld, (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 880, affd (U.S. 1943) 11 U.S.L.W.
4457; !kola v. Snoqualmie Falls Lumber Co., 12 Wash. (2d) 341, 121 P. (2d)
369 (1942). Cf. Woolfolk v. Orino, (D.C. Ore. 1942) 5 W. H. REP. 132. In Labates v. Interstate Co., (D.C. Tenn. 1941) 4 W. H. REP. 91, the act was held inapplicable to cooks in a restaurant located in a railroad station operated by the owner under
lease from an interstate railroad.
91
Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co. v. Hargrave, (C.C.A. 10th, 1942) 129 F. (2d)
655; Shepler v. Crucible Fuel Co., (D.C. Pa. 1943) 6 W. H. REP. 185; Timberlake
v. Day & Zimmerman, (D.C. Iowa, 1943) 6 W. H. REP. 208; Green v. Riss & Co.,
(D.C. Mo. 1942) 45 F. Supp. 648; Holland v. Amoskeag Mach. Co., (D.C. N.H.
1942) 44 F. Supp. 884; Batt v. Spector, (D.C. Tex. 1942) 5 W. H. REP. 357;
Fleming v. Swift & Co., (D.C. Ill. 1941); 41 F. Supp. 825; Williams v. General
Mills, (D.C. Ohio, 1941) 39 F. Supp. 849; Flores v. Baetjer, (D.C. P.R. 1941) 4
W. H. REP. 471; Steger v. Beard & Stone Elec. Co., (D.C. Tex. 1941) 4 W. H.
REP. 41 I; Lefevers v. General Export Iron & Metal Co., (D.C. Tex. 1940) 36 F.
Supp. 838; Berger v. Clouser, (D.C. Pa. 1940) 36 F. Supp. 168. See also Acme
Lumber Co. v. Shaw, (Ala. 1942) IO So. (2d) 285; Johnson v. Phillips-Buttorff Mfg.
Co., 178 Tenn. 559, 160 S.W. (2d) 893 (1941), cert. denied (U.S. 1943) 63 S.
Ct. 43; Robertson v. Oil Well Drilling Co., (N. M. 1942) 131 P. (2d) 978; McMilan v. Wilson & Co., 212 Minn. 142, 2 N. W. (2d) 838 (1942); Pruett v.
Carruthers & Son Lumber Co., (Tenn. App. 1942) 5 W. H. REP. 192; Niehaus v.
Greenspon's Son Pipe Corp., (Mo. App. 1942) 164 S.W. (2d) 180; Robinson & Co.
v. Larue, 178 Tenn. 197, 156 S.W. (2d) 432 (1941); Atkocus v. Terker, (N.Y. City
Mun. Ct. 1941) 30 N.Y.S. (2d) 628. In another group of cases where the act was
held applicable, watchmen performed services other than guarding property--e.g.,
tending furnaces or boilers; Muldowney v. Seaberg Elevator Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1941)
39 F. Supp. 275; Wood v. Central Sand & Gravel Co., (D.C. Tenn. 1940) 33 F. Supp.
40; Spinner v. Waterways Fuel & Dock Co., 70 Ohio App. 121, 41 N. E. (2d) 144
88
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engaged in the production of goods for commerce. In the Kirschbaum
and Arsenal Building Corporation cases 92 the Supreme Court held,
one justice dissenting, that building maintenance employees of landlords whose tenants were principally engaged in production of goods
for interstate commerce were within the scope of the act, since the work
of the employees had such a close and immediate connection with the
process of production and was such an essential part of it that their
occupation was necessary for the production of goods for commerce.
With respect to maintenance workers in office buildings that house tenants engaged in interstate commerce but who do not produce goods for
commerce, the recent refusal of the Supreme Court to review the decision in Johnson v. Dallas Downtown Development Co. 93 leaves in
(1942); Hanson v. Queensboro Farm Products, (N.Y. 1942) 5 W. H. REP. 255;
Milam v. Texas Spring & Wheel Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) 157 S. W. (2d) 653;
Crompton v. Baker, 220 N.C. 52, 16 S.E. (2d) 471 (1941). Contra: Waller v.
Humphreys, (C.C.A. 5th, 1943) 133 F. (2d) 193; Swanzy v. Safety Convoy Co.,
(D.C. Tex. 1942) 5 W. H. REP. 472; Truitt v. Neuhoff Bros., (D.C. Tex. 1942)
5 W. H. REP. 461; Brown v. Carter Drilling Co., (D.C. Tex. 1941) 38 F. Supp.
489; Rogers v. Glazer, (D.C. Mo. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 990. See also Carter v. Royal
Crown Bottling Co., (Tenn. Cir. Ct. 1943) 6 W. H. REP. 66; Carpenter v. Waxahachie Cotton Warehouse, (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) 162 S. W. (2d) 139; Hart v.
Gregory, 220 N.C. 180, 16 S.E. (2d) 837 (.1941); Killingbeck v. Garment Center
Capitol, 259 App. Div. 691, 20 N.Y.S. (2d) 521, appeal denied, 259 App. Div. 1076,
21 N.Y.S. (2d) 610 (1940). Cf. Southern Package Corp. v. Walton, (Miss. 1943)
II So. ( 2d) 91 2. In many of these cases holding the act inapplicable the facts are
distinguishable and the same result could have been reached on other grounds.
With respect to watchmen furnished by independent agencies to customers engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, the act was held
applicable in Walling v. Sondock, (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 132 F. (2d) 77, cert. denied
Sondock v. Walling, (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 769. Contra: Bartholome v. Baltimore
Fire Patrol Co., (D.C. Md. 1942) 48 F. Supp. 98; Farr v. Smith Detective Agency,
(D.C. Tex. 1941) 38 F. Supp. 105; Schrieber v. Kane Service, (D.C. Ill. 1940)
3 W H. REP. 459. See also Walling v. Allied Messenger Service, (D.C. N.Y. 1942)
47 F. Supp. 773.
92
Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, Arsenal Building Corp. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517,
62 S. Ct. 1 II 6 ( 1942). These two cases involving similar fact situations were decided
together.
93
Johnson v. Dallas Downtown Dev. Co. (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 132 F. (2d) 287,
cert. den. (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 994. Accord: Cochran v. Florida Nat. Bldg.
Corp., (D.C. Fla. 1942) 45 F. Supp. 830; Johnson v. Filstow, (D.C. Fla. 1942)
43 F. Supp. 930; Lofther v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, (D.C. Ill. 1942) 48 F. Supp.
692; Johnson v. Masonic Bldg. Co., (D.C. Ga. 1942) 6 W. H. REP. 19; Tate v.
Empire Bldg. Corp., (D.C. Tenn. 1942) 5 W. H. REP. 475; Brandell v. Continental
Ill. Bank & Trust Co., (D.C. Ill. 1941) 43 F. Supp. 781; Patterson v. Memphis Cotton
Exchange Realty Co., (Tenn. Ch. 1943) 6 W. H. REP. 308; In re Liquidation of
New York Title & Mortgage Co., (N.Y. 1943) 6 W. H. REP. 152; Robinson v. Mass.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., (Tenn. 1941) 158 S. W. (2d) 441; Cecil v. Gradison, (Ohio
App. 1941) 40 N.E. (2d) 958; Stoike v. First Nat. Bank, (N.Y. 1943) 6 W. H.
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effect the holding of the circuit court of appeals that the act does not
extend to such workers. Courts taking this position have refused to
apply the reasoning of the Kirschbaum case on the ground that the act's
definition of interstate commerce does not include "necessary occupations" as does the definition of production for interstate commerce.
Under this view, the doctrine of the Kirschbaum case would be limited
to those employees of landlords whose tenants produced on the premises
goods for interstate commerce. The division has contended, in opposition to this dual standard, that no distinction should be drawn between maintenance service for tenants producing goods for commerce
or services in commerce, since in both cases the maintenance of safe and
habitable buildings is indispensable to the tenants' occupations, and the
labor cost of such service, reflected in rentals, is an item in the cost of
the tenants' interstate business with a direct effect on prices of goods
and services.94 The division's position has been upheld by several
courts.95
An examination of the cases involving employees whose activities
have been considered "necessary" to the production of goods for interstate commerce indicates that in general the term "necessary" has not
been construed as "indispensable"; rather it appears to be sufficient that
the activities be convenient or useful in the production of goods for
commerce. No formula can be laid down as to when the relation of an
activity to production of goods for interstate commerce wi\l be sufficiently tenuous to prevent extension of coverage, but it seems clear
that in general the courts are inclined to liberal construction of the
statutory language here involved.
V
INTERSTATE COMMERCE ONCE REMOVED

Employees engaged in the production of goods which move out of
the state of production are within the scope of the act even though the
415. Cf Johnson v. Great Nat. Life Ins. Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) 166 S.W.
(2d) 935.
94
5 W. H. REP. 889 (1942). The division has indicated that it will not seek
to enforce the act if less than 20% of the building space is devoted to interstate commerce activities. 5 W. H. REP. 813 (1942).
95
Merryfield v. Hoyt Shoe Corp., (C.C.A. 1st, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 452; Lorenzetti v. American Trust Co., (D.C. Cal. 1942) 45 F. Supp. 128. In the Lorenzetti
case, supra, the act was held to cover janitors furnished under contract by an independent building maintenance company to state banks.
REP.
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' employer does not himself ship the goods to out-of-state destinations,96
and it is not determinative that title passes from the original producer
· to the purchaser within the state of production.97 The purpose of the
act is the protection of commerce without regard to ·the ownership of
goods moving in it.98 Thus sale of the product by the original producer
at the place of production does not necessarily constitute a transaction
complete in itself without reference to subsequent activities of purchasers so as to insulate the producer from application of the act; 99 and
whether the manufacturer is himself responsible for subsequent movement in interstate commerce or whether his activities with respect to
the goods are termi!!ated by local delivery to _purchasers who thereafter
ship them in interstate commerce in their original or changed form i~
not material.100 The test for application of the act is whether the pro96 Walling v. Peoples Packing Co., (C.C.A. 10th, 1942) 132 F. (2d) 236, cert.
denied (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 831; Enterprise Box Co. v. Fleming, (C.C.A. 5th,
1942) 125 F (2d) 897, cert. denied 316 U.S. 704, 62 S. Ct. 1312 (1942); Tucker
v. Hitchcock, (D.C. Fla. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 874; Walling v. Higgins, (D.C. Pa.
1942) 47 F. Supp. 856; Walling v. Kerr_, (D.C. Pa. 1942) 47 F. Supp. 852; Walling
v. Pine, (D.C. Okla. 1942) 5 W. H. REP.' 518; Divine v. Levy, (D.C. La. 1941)
39 F. Supp. 44; Fleming v. Hitchcock, (D.C. Fla. 1941) 38 F. Supp. 358; St. John
v. Brown, (D.C. Tex. ·1941) 38 F. Supp. 385; Fleming v. Schiff, (D.C. Colo. 1941)
5 W. H. REP. 43; Allen v. Moe, (D.C. Idaho, 1941) 39 F. Supp. 5; Whigham v.
Tucker Oil Co., (D.C. Tex. 1941) 4 W. H. REP. 274; Wood v. Central Sand &
Gravel Co., (D.C. Tenn. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 40. Contra: Bagby v. Cleveland Wrecking Co., (D.C. Ky. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 271~ The act has been held inapplicable to:
( 1) a company buying gas and selling it to a local refinery which sold. the refined
products to purchasers who shipped some of them interstate, Ligon v. United Gas Pipe,
Line Co., (D.C. Tex. 1941) 4 W. H. REP. 422; (2) a company producing oil on a
leasehold estate for sale in tanks on the estate to a pipe line company, Dupree v. Bay, Tex Oil Corp., (D.C. Tex. 1940) 4 W. H. REP. 8; (3) an employee of a tire service
company who engaged in repairing tires for individuals who put them on vehicles
which at some time or other went out of the state, Hayes v. General Tire Service,
(D.C. Tex. 1941) 4 W. H. REP. 459; The act was held applicable to maintenance
employees of a lessor of trucks where a substantial number of lessees used the trucks to
transport goods interstate, Snyder v. Casale, (D.C. N.Y. 1942) 5 W. H. REP. 222.
7
il Hamlet Ice Co. v. Fleming, (C.C.A. 4th, 1942) 127 F. (2d) 165, cert. denied
(U.S. 1942) 63 S. Ct. 29.
gs Fleming v. Alterman, (D.C. Ga. !941) 38 F. Supp. 94.
99 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941); Enterprise Box
• Co.. v. Fleming, (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 125 F. (2d) 897, cert. denied 316 U.S. 704,
62 S. Ct. 1312 (1942); Divine v. Levy, (D.C. La. 1941) 39 F. Supp. 44; St. John
v. Brown, (D.C. Tex. 1941) 38 F. Supp. 385; Sunshine Mining Co. v. Carver, (D.C."
Idaho, 1940) 34 F. Supp. 274. Contra: Bagby v. Cleveland Wrecking Co., (D.C.
Ky. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 271.
100
Enterprise Box Co. v. Fleming, (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 125 F. (2d) 897, cert.
denied 316 U.S. 704, 62 S. Ct. 1312 (1942}; Walling v. Higgins, (D.C. Pa. 1942)
47 F. Supp. 856; Walling v. Kerr, (D.C. Pa. 1942) 47 F. Supp. 852.
.
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ducer knows or has reason to know that his product will be shipped
across state lines by himself or others when it is produced.101 Where the
local purchaser further processes the goods before shipment interstate,
the act applies to him and as well to the original producer and to intermediate processors.1°2 In this case the goods of the original producer
and the intermediate processors form a "part or ingredient" 108 of the
finished product moving interstate, and employees of those producers
or processors are performing the first steps in a series of operations that
produce articles going into commerce.104 Coverage has also been extended to workers whose employer was engaged in processing goods
owned and used by local manufacturers in the production of finished
products shipped across state lines.105
The act clearly applies to employees of ice producers who sell some
of their product locally to interstate carriers for refrigerating products
moving in interstate commerce.106 The Wage and Hour Division has,
101
In the majority of cases it is expressly stated that the producer knew or had
reason to know that his product would move interstate when produced. In other cases
where there is no express statement, examination of the facts indicates that the original
producer could not well have been unaware that his product, after local sale, would
move interstate. Courts in general appear to have been reluctant to permit producers
to defend by contending that they did not know their products would move interstate.
In St. John v. Brown, (D.C. Tex. 1941) 38 F. Supp. 385 at 388, the court said,
"They [local oil producers] must be held to know that which is of such common
knowledge that the courts may take judicial knowledge of it, viz., that the greater
percentage of all crude oil products in Texas .•. goes out of our State, though it may
be in the form of by-products, for ultimate consumption." See also Walling v. Pine,
(D.C. Okla. 1942) 5 W. H. REP. 518.
102
Walling v. Pine, (D.C. Okla. -1942) 5 W. H. REP. 518; Divine v. Levy,
(D.C. La. 1941) 39 F. Supp. 44; Sunshine Mining Co. v. Carver, (D.C. Idaho, 1940)
34 F. Supp. 274; Sykes v. Lochmann, (Kan. 1943) 132 P. (2d) 620, cert. denied,
lI U.S.L.W. 3354 (1943); Crompton v. Baker, 220 N.C. 52, 16 S.E. (2d)
4 7 I ( I 941). The act has been held inapplicable to employees of mining companies
required under the Gold Reserve Act to deliver gold bullion to a United States mint
in another state. Fox v. Summit King Mines, (D.C. Nev. 1943) 48 F. Supp. 952;
Holland v. Haile Gold Mines, (D.C. S.C. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 641. In the Haile
case it was argued that there is a single market and one price fixed by governmental
order, with the result that the absence of competition insulates each producer and his
wages from every other producer and his wages; therefore the act cannot apply to intrastate wages in noncompetitive production.
108
See§ 3 (i) of the act, 52 Stat. L. 1061 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1940), § 203 (i).
104
Walling v. Peoples Packing Co., (C.C.A. 10th, 1942) 132 F. (2d) 236, cert.
denied (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 831; Divine v. Levy, (D.C. La. 1941) 39 F. Supp. 44;
Sunshine Mining Co. v. Carver, (D.C. Idaho, 1940) 34 F. Supp. 274.
105
Walling v. Kerr, {D.C. Pa. 1942) 47 F. Supp. 852.
106
Hamlet Ice Co. v. Fleming, (C.C.A. 4th,· 1942) 127 F. (2d) 165, cert.
denied, (U.S. 1942) 63 S. Ct. 29; Atlantic Co. v. Walling, (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 131
F. (2d) 518; Nelson v. Southern Ice Co., (D.C. Tex. 1941) 4 W. H. REP. 562;
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indicated that it will not assert coverage in the case of employees engaged in production of ice for refrigerating cars in the state of production of the ice and final destination of the goods shipped in the
cars,101 thus distinguishing between production of ice for this purpose
in the state of final destination of the goods and in other states along
the interstate route. It has been contended that ice is not "goods" within the meaning of the act, since upon delivery to the interstate carrier
it passes into the actual physical possession of the ultimate consumer;
but this contention has been rejected on the ground that the exclusion
of goods in the actual physical possession of the ultimate consumer 108
does not extend to goods considered with reference to production.100
It would seem essential, if federal regulation of substandard labor
conditions is to be e:ffective, that the coverage of the act should reach
backward to the original producer whose goods move immediately in
interstate commerce and to those who either produce goods which are
a part or ingredient of the goods of another or further process goods
which in the normal course of business would move in interstate commerce. Otherwise the provisions of the act as to production employees
could be evaded by the expedient of selling to out-of-state purchasers
f .o.b. the producer's factory or selling locally to distributors or processors who, in turn, would sell the goods in interstate commerce. So too
it would seem essential that coverage be extended to workers whose
activities, though not strictly manufacture or distribution of goods in
Gordon v. Paducah Ice Co., (D.C. Ky. 1941) 41 F. Supp. 980. Contra: Chapman v.
Home Ice Co., (D.C. Tenn. 1942) 43 F. Supp. 424. The act was held inapplicable
in Gaston v. Dalton Ice Co., (D.C. Ga. 1943) 6 W. H. REP. 241, on the de minimis
doctrine. Coverage was denied to a night engineer operating machinery producing ice
sold to interstate carriers, Couch v. Ward, (Ark. 1943) 168 S.W. (2d) 822, and to
employees of a cold storage company operating -machinery for refrigeration of space
leased to tenants who were local distributors of products some of which originated outside of the state, Cliett v. Miami Crystal Ice & Storage Co., (D.C. Fla. 1942) 5 W. H.
REP. 587. On the theory that stoppage by storage of interstate shipments intended
later to go forward in continuation of such commerce, does not remove the goods from
commerce, employees of a cold storage warehouse where a substantial amount of goods
originated out-of-state and, after storage, were reshipped to out-of-state points, were
held within the act by the district court in Fleming v. Atlantic Co., (D:C. Ga. I 941)
40 F. Supp. 654. This part of the decision was not appealed from. Atlantic Co. v.
Walling, (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 518 at 520.
107
5 w. H. REP. 293 (1942).
108
Sec. 3 (i), 52 Stat. L. ·1061 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1940), § 203 (i).
109 Hamlet Ice Co. v. Fleming, (C.C.A. 4th, 1942) 127 F. (2d) 165, cert.
denied (U.S. 1942) 63 S. Ct. 29; Atlantic Co. v. Walling, (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 131
F (2d) 518. Ice was held not to be "goods" in Chapman v. Home Ice Co., (D.C.
Tenn. 1942) 43 F. Supp. 424, and Couch v. Ward, (Ark. 1943) 168 S.W. (2d) 822.
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interstate commerce, are essential to the carrying on of interstate commerce-e.g., workers producing ice for refrigeration.

VI
CoNsTRUCTION AND REPAIR OF FACILITIES UsED IN PRODUCTION
oF Gooos FOR CoMMERCE

A. New Construction
The Wage and Hour Division has taken the pos1t1on that new
construction usually is not to be considered subject to the act unless
such construction is "an integral part of the production of a specific type
of goods for commerce." 110 It argues that the utility of a factory building is not limited to the production of the commodity originally contemplated, therefore employees engaged in erecting a building in which
goods are to be produced for commerce are to be regarded as a step
removed from actual productive operations.111 The few cases involving
this situation have held that employees engaged in new construction are
not within the act.112
As an example of construction which is "an integral part of the
production of a specific type of goods for commerce," which it contends
is covered by the act, the division cites the original construction of oil
derricks or related construction activities which are carried on solely to
the end of conducting subsequent drilling operations resulting directly
in the production of oil and cannot serve, as can a factory, any other
productive purpose.118 This general problem was involved in WarrenBradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall. 114 Petitioner, an independent contractor, owned and operated rotary drilling equipment, contracting with
owners or lessees of oil lands to drill to an agreed-upon depth short
of the oil sand stratum, the well then being "brought in" or shown to
110
1942 W. H. MAN. 44. Employees transporting or unloading materials from
out-of-state may, however, be "engaged in commerce."
lll 1942 w. H. MAN. 45.
112
Carter v. Pritchard & Co., (D.C. Mo. 1943) 6 W. H. REP. 162, new trial
denied 6 W. H. REP. 307 (1943); Belzano v. Williamsl.(D.C. Cal. 1942) 6 W. H.
REP. 113; Walling v. Snellings, (D.C. Ala. 1942) 5 W. H. REP. 795.
113
1942 W. H. MAN. 45.
114
317 U.S. 88, 63 S. Ct. 125 (1942). The act was held applicable to oil drilling employees where the employer drilled wells for other parties and itself, substantially
all the oil and gas moving interstate. Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, (D.C. Okla.
1942) 6 W. H. REP. 159; Burgess v. Phillips Petroleum Co., (Kan. Dist. Ct. 1942)
5 W. H. REP. 606. Cf. Zehring v. Brown Materials, (D.C. Cal. 1943) 48 F. Supp.
740, and Corbett v. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp., (D.C. Tex. 1942) 43 F.
Supp. 605.
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be a dry hole by a separate cable drilling crew. Petitioner was neither
owner nor lessee of any of the lands on which drilling was undertaken
and was not sho'wn to have any interest in the lands or in the oil produced. Respondents were members of the rotary drilling crew working
on wells in the Panhandle field of Texas. The Supreme Court held,
one justice dissenting, that respondents were within the scope of the
act, being engaged in a process or occupation necessary to the production
of oil. The Court rejected the contention of petitioner· that, as an independent contractor not financially interested in the wells, it had no•
intention, expectation or belief that any oil produced would move interstate, saying in answer:
" ... Petitioner, closely identified as it is with the business of oil
production, cannot escape the impact of the Act by a transparent
claim of ignorance of the interstate character of the Texas oil industry." 115
Nor was it material that the contractor itself was not engaged in
producing oil for interstate commerce, since the test is the character of
the employees' activities.
Thus the Court applies once more the broad interpretation of coverage laid down in the Kirschbaum case.

B. Maintenance and Repair
Employees engaged in repairing buildings and machinery used in
producing goods for interstate commerce appear to be within the scope
of the act as engaged in a process or occupation necessary to the production of goods for commerce.116 Without itself producing goods for
interstate commerce, a firm may be subject to the act if the work of its
employees contributes to the interstate operations of other companies;111
If a plant is shut down terriporarily in order that necessary repairs may
be made conveniently and future production is contemplated after the
repair work is completed, the act would appear to be applicable, although the building or machine is not presently being-used to produce
goods for commerce; 118 and the same is true of repair work undertaken
during the dead season of a seasonal industry.m If, however, the plant
115

317 U:S. 88 at 92-93, 63 S. Ct. 125 (1942).
Holland v. Amoskeag Mach. Co., (D.C. N.H. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 884; Suarez
v. Bowie, (D.C. P.R. 1942) 5 W. H .REP. 403.
117
Holland v. Amoskeag Mach. Co., (D.C. N.H. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 884. See
also Crawford v. Campbell, (Okla. Ct. Com. Pleas, 1943) 6 W. H. REP. 156.
118
See 1942 W. H. MAN. 46.
119 Bowie v. Gonzalez, (C.C.A. 1st, 1941) 117 F. (2d) II; Suarez v. Bowie,
(D.C. P.R. 1942) 5 W. H. REP. 403.
116
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is permanently shut down and no future production for interstate commerce is contemplated, employees doing repair work to fit the building
for some nonproductive purpose appear not to be covered.120
. CONCLUSION

The general outlines of the act's coverage are relatively clear. It
reaches production of goods before interstate commerce has begun,
extending backward to employees of the producers of goods intended in
the normal course of business to move immediately in interstate commerce and to employees of the producer of goods which are a part or
ingredient of the goods of another or whose goods are further processed
by another who in the normal course of business would ship them across
state lines. It applies to those engaged directly in the physical processes
of production and as well to those whose activities are necessary to the
processes of production and to those who maintain and operate essential
instrumentalities by which interstate commerce is conducted.
The Supreme Court's refusal to review the decision in Johnson v.
Dallas Downtown Development Co. 121 leaves in effect the holding of
the circuit court of appeals that the act does not extend to maintenance
workers whose services are performed for tenants engaged in interstate
commerce but not in production of goods for such commerce. While it
is arguable that there is warrant in the statutory language for such a
distinction, the establishment of a dual standard seems unfortunate
since in terms of economic effects there is no ground for distinguishing
between maintenance service for tenants producing goods for commerce
or services m commerce.
The act reaches forward to the distributive functions, covering at
least warehouse employees of independent wholesalers a substantial
part of whose activities involve procurement or receipt of goods of outof-state origin and handling or delivering to local customers of goods
from other states pursuant to either special orders or pre-existing contracts or understandings with customers and warehouse employees of
chain stores engaged in ordering and procuring goods from other states
and unloading and checking them before they are deposited on the
unloading platform of the warehouse. The applications of the "state
of rest" and "prior order" doctrines in their most rigid forms would
seem to be precluded by the Jacksonville Paper Co. decision; but in the
absence of special orders or pre-existing contracts or understandings
120
121

1942 W. H. MAN. 46. .
(C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 132 F. (2d) 287, cert. den. (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 994.
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with customers, it is not clear as to what course of business on the part
of the independent wholesaler will be sufficient to establish the continuity of movement necessary to keep goods "in commerce" as they
pass through the warehouse to retail stores. With respect to the chain
store, the Supreme Court's refusal to review the Goldblatt case leaves
in effect the lower court holding that the unloading platform is the
dividing line between coverage and noncoverage. The American Stores
case, on the other hand, applies the "practical continuity of movement"
test of the Jacksonville Paper Co. case and lays the basis for a more
satisfa~tory approach to the chain store situation.
Attempts to remedy substandard labor conditions by state action
have proved. in large measure ineffective, in part because of the fear
that local producers required to comply with minimum wage and maximum hour requirements .would be placed at a disadvantage in competition with producers from other states subject to lower standards or
no standard!5. Congress, doubtless aware of the abortive attempts at
remedial action by the individual states, nevertheless refrained from
exercising to the fullest extent its constitutional powers under the commerce clause and indicated its intention that certain segments of industrial activity should be excluded from the coverage of the act and left
to state regulation. In light of the traditional theory as to the judicial
function, courts cannot well write into the act that which Congress itself
did not see fit to put there; but in view of the broad economic and
social objectives of the act, manifested by its declaration of policy, the
tendency of courts in general to extend coverage to the fullest extent
within the limits of the statutory language seems desirable.

